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Abstract 
Increases in the pump price of petroleum have been incessant in Nigeria. It first took off at 15.3 Kobo per litre in 
1978, when General Olusegun Obasanjo was Military Head of State, to 70 Naira in 2007 when same Obasanjo 
presided over Nigeria’s civil rule. Incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan reviewed it upward to 141 Naira in 
2012, thus sparking nationwide protests that reversed the price per litre of petrol to its current price of 97 Naira. 
A further increase appears imminent, as the central government still intends to ensure a total removal of 
petroleum subsidy. This study is an addition to other studies on mass media’s power to influence and reinforce 
the relative importance of issues in the psyche of news audiences. With the fuel subsidy crisis of 2012 as its 
focus, the study examined the reportage of the issue by The Punch and Vanguard newspapers, in terms of their 
frequency of reports, prominence given, direction of editorial contents, and the tone used in reporting the issue. 
Inference drawn from the findings is that there was an interaction between the priority accorded the fuel subsidy 
removal crisis by the press (media agenda), and the importance attached to it by the public through their reaction 
(public agenda), as well as subsequent government policy reversal (policy agenda).   
Keywords: Price variation, crisis, media agenda, public agenda, and policy agenda   
 
1. Introduction 
Fuel-related crises have become common in Nigeria, where large crude oil deposits abound, which is an exporter 
of the commodity. It is pathetic to observe that no other member of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) or a country that does not produce oil shares similar ugly experience with Nigeria (Badmus, 
2009:25). This undesirable situation led to the introduction of the controversial issue of subsidy in the 
downstream oil sector, which nearly tore Nigeria into pieces, still threatens its peace and democratic structure.  
Economically, subsidy exists when government assists consumers of a given commodity to pay less than the 
prevailing market price of the commodity. In respect of fuel subsidy, it means that consumers would pay less 
than the price per litre of petroleum product. On the other hand, fuel subsidy refers to the difference between the 
actual market price per litre of petroleum products and what the final consumers pay for it. Today, the difference, 
which is borne by the government, is due to some eight 'import-induced costs'. These costs, according to Afonne 
(2011:18) are responsible for the high prices of petroleum products in Nigeria.  
Since petroleum industry became the dominant sector in Nigeria, the volume of agricultural exports have 
declined sharply, with production of agro-allied products faced with a drastic decline. Consequently, agricultural 
import has increased dramatically. In the light of this background, the paper aims at examining the impact of fuel 
subsidy removal on output in Nigeria 
2. Problem Statement 
Fuel (or petrol) is central to the economic pursuits of Nigerians, whose sustenance daily bread is tied to this bye-
product of Nigeria’s rich crude oil deposits, its major foreign exchange earner. Of importance is the crisis that 
ensued as an aftermath of government’s pronouncement of the removal of fuel subsidy in January 2012, 
especially as regards the newspaper coverage of the issue, leaves a question mark, the solution to which this 
study seeks. Thus, the study is an examination of press reportage of 2012 fuel subsidy removal-triggered crisis in 
Nigeria 
2.1 Research Objectives 
The research effort aims to achieve the following objectives: 
To examine the frequency of reportage of 2012 fuel subsidy removal crisis by the press 
To determine the prominence given the issue by the newspapers 
To ascertain the direction of editorial contents of the Punch and Vanguard newspapers 
To fathom if there is any inference between the newspapers’ reportage and public’s perception of the crisis  
2.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions guided this study: 
RQ1. What was the frequency of reportage of the fuel subsidy removal crisis by Nigerian newspapers? 
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RQ2. What was the level of prominence given to the crisis by the press? 
RQ3. What was the direction of the newspapers’ contents on the crisis? 
RQ4. What was the kind of tone used in the reportage of fuel subsidy removal crisis by the press?  
RQ5. What inference can be drawn from a relationship between press reportage of the issue and public 
perception of it? 
3. Literature Review 
The history of fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria is rather a long one, particularly with its negative effects. Fuel 
subsidy removal dates back to 1978, when the then military government, General Olusegun Obasanjo reviewed 
the pump price of fuel from 8.4 kobo to 15.37 kobo. The concern was for government to generate enough money 
to run the administration, particularly when it was preparing for the 1979 democratic elections and to cater to the 
social needs of Nigerians.  
In January 1982, the civilian regime of Alhaji Shehu Shagari also raised the pump price to 20 kobo from 15.37 
kobo. Money realized from the fuel increase was used by members of the regime to buy properties in major 
capitals of European nations (USA, UK, Spain, France and others), as against using same to put in place social 
services that Nigerians badly needed then. The inept leadership of the then NPN national government and the 
corruption that bedeviled the administration led to its Overthrown. Then the military junta of General Ibrahim 
Babangida increased the pump price of fuel to 39.50 kobo on March 31, 1986. This regime was notorious for 
numerous pump price increases.  
On April 10, 1988, the Babangida-led regime increased it to 42 kobo from 39.50 kobo per litre, and then again to 
60 kobo for private cars on January 1, 1989. These increases came at the time the regime chose to adopt a 
homegrown Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as against external borrowing. His decision sparked-off 
massive protests by Nigerians., for whom the economic down turn and fuel price increases made life unbearable. 
Nigerians reacted angrily. Again, on March 6, 1991, the Babangida administration raised the pump price from 60 
kobo to 70kobo. Not too long, the Nigerian nation was subjected to another round of fuel increase, when in 
November 8, 1993, the pump price was raised to N5.00. Greeted with mass protests across Nigeria, the price was 
reduced to N2.50 on November 22, 1993. A year later, on October 2nd, 1994, it was again raised to N15.00 only 
to be reduced two days later to N11.00 by the Gen. Sanni Abacha's regime. The reduction had considered the 
mass protests and the need to win the support of Nigerians. On December 20, 1998, the pump went up to N25, 
but was cut down to N20 on January 6, 1999, after a month. This was during Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar’s brief 
transitional reign as a Nigeria’s military leader.  
Like others before him, he did not spare Nigerians the burden of fuel price increases. The decision triggered 
protests in which Nigerians, the organized labour and the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) pressed for a 
reversal. It is necessary at this point to place on record that it was only both the military junta of Buhari/Idiagbon 
and Umaru Shehu Yar’Adua that did not review the pump of fuel. However, this may have been due to the brief 
reign of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime and the ill health of Yar’Adua respectively.  
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo’s second coming as a civilian president did not help matters. In his eight-year reign, he 
increased the price per litre of fuel, beginning June 1, 2000, when he jerked up the price per litre to N30, only to 
be reduced to N25, having been rejected in massive protests by organized labour, civil society organizations and 
the ordinary Nigerians. Five days later, on June 13, 2000, the pump price witnessed an adjustment to N22. On 
January 1, 2002, Obasanjo struck again raising the price of the commodity from N22 to N26, and then to N40 in 
the year that followed (June 23, 2003). In June 2007, it rose again to N70, which Yar’Adua cut down to N65 
when he assumed office in May 2007.  
It had remained so, until President Goodluck Jonathan opted for an outright removal of fuel subsidy. 
Interestingly, an erstwhile President of the Nigeria Labour Congress and current governor of Nigeria’s Edo State, 
Comrade Adams Oshiomole, who previously had championed protests against fuel subsidy removal, also called 
for complete removal of it. The issue was that, while nationwide consultations and discussions on fuel subsidy 
removal were still on, the Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) on January 1, 2012, 
announced the outright removal of fuel subsidy, leaving petrol to sell at a record N141 per litre. The decision 
angered did not go down well with the public; it led to massive strike actions and protests by the Nigeria Labour 
Congress (NLC), Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC), PENGASSAN, Civil Society Organizations, and the 
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) among other advocacy bodies. The protests nearly transformed 
into a “Nigerian Spring” that could have wrecked grave consequences; so vehement were the demonstrations that 
government rescinded the option of outright removal, agreed to a partial removal, which brought and reduced the 
pump price to N97 thus, it remains so until date. 
(3) 
Below is a table presenting a clearer picture of the different pump prices orchestrated by the different 
administrations in Nigeria from 1978 to January 2012. 
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Table 1: Data on Petroleum Prices/Adjustments in Nigeria (1978-2012) 
 
S/N Date             Administration Price 
(k) 
Percent (%) 
1 1978 Gen Olusegun Obasanjo (as military ruler)  15.3  
2 1982 Gen Shehu Shagari 20   
3 1990 Gen Ibrahim Babangida  60 300 
4 1992 Gen Ibrahim Babangida  70 17 
5 1992 Gen Ibrahim Babangida  3.25 364 
6 1993 Gen Ibrahim Babangida   54 
7 1994 Chief Ernest Shonekan 5 120 
8 1994/9
8 
Gen Sani Abacha 11 - 
9 2000 Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (as civilian ruler) 20 82 
10 2000 Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (as civilian ruler) 22 10 
11 2001 Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (as civilian ruler) 26 18 
12 2003 Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (as civilian ruler) 40 54 
13 2004 Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (as civilian ruler) 45 13 
14 2007 Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (as civilian ruler) 70 56 
15 2007 Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua 65 0.07 
16 2012 
till date 
Dr Ebele Goodluck Jonathan 141 117 
Source: Communiqué by South -South Leaders 2012 (as cited in Atoyebi K. et al., 2012) 
 
Data in Table 1 show that Nigerians have witnessed fuel increases since 1978, when General Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s regime raised the pump price of gasoline from 8.4 kobo to 15.37 kobo. It is pertinent to note that 
General Babangida and President Obasanjo are reputed to have made the most increases within each of their 
eight years in office. 
 
Table 2: Petrol Prices in Selected Oil Producing Countries as at 2012 
S/N Countries Pump Price in US Dollar 
1 Algeria 0.41                     
2 Bahrain 0.27  
3 Brunei 0.39  
4 Egypt 0.31  
5 Iraq 0.38  
6 Kuwait 0.22  
7 Libya  0.17  
8 Nigeria  0.87  
9 Oman  0.31  
10 Qatar  0.22  
11 Saudi Arabia  0.16  
12 UAE  0.49  
13 Venezuela  0.023  
Source: Compiled by Germans Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Published by Wikipedia, 2012 (cited in 
Atoyebi K. et al., 2012) 
 
While it may be difficult to get a comprehensive list of countries with their fuel pump prices, a few instances, as 
captured by the German Technical Cooperation, are analyzed here (See Table 2). The Table clearly shows that 
fuel is more expensive in oil-rich Nigeria. The argument here is that what Nigerians pay for petrol is too high – 
they ‘own the resource, but the corrupt members of the political elite think otherwise. 
The will to effect far-reaching changes in Nigeria’s petroleum sector has been lacking among the country’s ruling 
elite, just as the appalling lack of enterprise manifested in the inertness that crippled the building of power 
stations for the future. This attitude also manifested even more cynically in the deliberate refusal to build 
refineries or maintain existing ones. Early last December, President Jonathan noted that the nation could face the 
danger of youth revolt, unless government provides jobs for the teeming unemployed youths roaming the streets 
of the country. He promised that his government was poised with the provision of 50, 000 jobs in the New Year. 
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How much he would be able to do this is another matter, as Nigerians had seen government after government 
make promises in the past, which they never kept. 
President Jonathan has repeatedly said that subsidy withdrawal is necessary to safeguard Nigeria's future. He 
said the total deregulation of the downstream sector would open up the oil industry for foreign investments that 
will lead to massive jobs creation and development. For instance, the government's Subsidy Reinvestment and 
Employment Programme (SURE-P), under which it listed among other projects, the construction or completion 
of eight major roads and two bridges, provision of health care for three million pregnant women, six railway 
projects, youth employment, mass transit, 19 irrigation projects, rural and urban water supply (Ofikhenn, 2011:4). 
In her own version, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, claimed that the removal of fuel subsidy 
was to save the country from bankruptcy because fund for subsidy on petroleum products was too huge. 
According to her, in a couple of years, Nigeria would be short of funds, should subsidies continue. 
Okonjo-Iweala supported her claim by saying that the subsidy fund was going into the wrong hands, made up of 
some cartels in the oil business, and who are the ones really enjoying the subsidy. The question is, are these 
cartels above the government that government turns the hammer on the masses instead of facing the identified 
cartels? While many Nigerians were not happy with the developments, some supported, while a third group 
sought a balance.  
Gen. Buhari has openly distanced himself from supporting such plans. Rather, he reveals that what goes into the 
subsidy policy is the cost of corruption in the opaque business of oil importation. Governor Muazu Babangida 
Aliyu of Niger State, rolling behind the federal government claimed that the policy was the best measure to 
regenerate the country's ailing petroleum sector. Aliyu was of the opinion that if fuel subsidy stopped, measures 
must be in place at local, state, and federal government levels to cushion likely effects, adding that not all of 
Nigeria's refineries were functional. He agreed that there was a cabal in the country enjoying the subsidy 
payments by the federal government to the detriment of Nigerians. This cabal, he said, did not want local 
refineries to work. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
Theories are particularly useful in helping us to predict the outcome of a research undertaken. This means that 
we can make predictions about the outcome of certain events (Anaeto et al., 2012).  The predictive power of 
theories makes them relevant and applicable to social research especially. According to Amobi and Sunday 
(2012), in addition to the descriptive functions of theories, theories have explanatory and predictive powers. 
Consequently, theories like agenda-setting, gate keeping framing, priming and spiral of silence have relevance to 
this study, as they highlight the ‘effective’ role of the media in the 2012 subsidy removal crisis in Nigeria. 
McCombs and Shaw, in describing a phenomenon long noticed and studied in the context of election campaigns 
coined the term ‘agenda-setting’ (Olorede, 2011).  McQuail (2000), cited in Olorede (2011), states further that 
the evidence collected at that time, and since consists of data showing a correspondence between the order of 
importance given in the media to ‘issues’ and order of significance attached to the same issue by the public and 
politicians. Agenda-setting theory seems quite appropriate to help us understand the pervasive role of the media, 
especially in political communication systems (Olorede, 2013). In the theory’s simplest and most direct version, 
then, the media agenda affects the public agenda, and the public agenda affects the policy agenda (Littlejohn & 
Foss, 2008). 
The idea of framing stemmed from agenda-setting theorists, who viewed it as a natural way in which second-
level agenda setting occurs (Littlejohn & Foss, 2008). They state that media depictions frame events in ways that 
constraint how audiences can interpret these events. This, according to them, can happen by various textual 
features of the ‘’story’’ such as headlines, audio-visual components, metaphors used, and the way in which the 
story is told, to name only a few of the ways framing functions.   
Beyond agenda-setting is the media’s power to prime, said Ogwezzy (2012), who studied factors influencing 
media output during April 2007 general elections in Nigeria. In the views of Baran and Davis (2009), priming is 
the idea that presentations in the media heighten the likelihood that people will develop similar thoughts about 
those things in the real world. Writing on aggressive cues, they said in terms of priming effect, media 
presentations of women as victims of violence heightens the likelihood that viewers, when confronted by real-
life women, will have similar thoughts about them. 
Also relevant in this discourse is the Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence theory. The authors’ views are 
at par with Ogwezzy’s (2012) who found that the spiral of silence as reinforcing media’s power to prime. 
According to Folarin (2002), the theory describes the tendency for individuals and groups to suppress their 
private opinions, under pressure from fear of isolation. Noelle-Neumann (1979, 1980), as cited in Folarin (2002), 
concludes that, largely, it is the media which create opinion. Folarin writes further that a majority of the public 
tends to see issues and persons as media see them adding that because society rewards conformity and punishes 
deviance the fear of isolation constrains people to conform to shared judgments held by the mass media. Since 
media can set agenda that can become public agenda or policy agenda by reinforcing publics’ dominant opinions, 
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their power to suppress certain opinions thus causes a spiral of silence. The propositions and assumptions of the 
theories, as explained above, justify their particular relevance and applicability to this study. 
 
5. Method 
Examination of the prominence given to the crisis resulting from the President’s January 1, 2012 broadcast of 
Federal Government’s removal of petroleum subsidy by the Nigerian newspapers was the focus of this study. 
The most suitable research method for this kind of study, according to Olorede (2011), is content analysis. 
Kerlinger (1973) defines content analysis as a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, 
objective and quantitative manner for measuring variables.  Accordingly, the researchers used content analysis 
because it is systematic, quantifiable and relatively cheap (Berelson, 1952, cited in Olorede 2011).   
5.1 Procedure 
Regular accessibility, circulation and popular readership were the criteria used to determine the eligibility of the 
national newspapers that made up the sampling frame for this study. Nine newspapers – The Nation, Vanguard, 
Daily Independent, The Champion, The Guardian, This Day, The Sun, The Punch, and National Mirror – formed 
the sampling frame, based on the eligibility criteria earlier stated. However, The Punch and Vanguard 
newspapers emerged through simple random sampling. A period of thirty-one days, January 1, 2012 to January 
31, 2012 was chosen. We used sixty two (62) editions, thirty-one (31) each of the two selected newspapers. The 
rationale for this was because the subsidy removal crisis under study had a two-week high intensity period 
(January 1 – 15) and two-week low intensity period (January 16 – 31). The first two weeks were active crisis 
periods highlighting government’s announcement of fuel subsidy removal, and the reaction to the announcement. 
The two weeks after showed a less active crisis period beginning from January 16, when the government 
reverted pump price from N141 to N97. 
5.2 Content Categories and Variables 
Straight news reports, editorials, opinions/columns, pictures/cartoons and letters to the editor were the five 
developed sets of observable categories, while frequency, prominence, direction of editorial contents, tone and 
inference were the variables measured. Using a similar method, Amobi and Sunday (2012) noted that state that 
number of reports about incident determines frequency, placement of the story in the newspaper determines 
prominence, while tone of language determines direction. We, however, measured direction and tone differently 
in this study. We measured direction in relation to whether reports were favourable, unfavourable or neutral; we 
measure tone in relation to whether the reports were harsh, soft or neutral. The extent of observable relationship 
between media agenda and public agenda determined inference. In other words, inference was in relation to 
whether media reportage of the crisis led to public perception of it as important. 
6. Results 
The five earlier stated research questions guide the presentation of the results of this study. The questions are as 
stated below: 
6.1 RQ1. What was the frequency of reportage of subsidy removal crisis by Nigerian newspapers? 
Research question one explores the frequency of reportage of the crisis resulting from the federal government’s 
removal of fuel subsidy by The Punch and Vanguard newspapers, whose contents we examined in relation to the 
number of times they reported the issue. As shown in the table below, there was high frequency of reportage of 
the crisis by the two newspapers, as they reported 6,130 out of 8,944 overall editorial items, amounting to 68.5 
per cent. 
Table3: Showing the frequency of reportage of fuel subsidy removal crisis by the Vanguard and the Punch 
newspapers 
Newspaper All Editorial items Editorial items on the Crisis Percentage 
Vanguard  4532  3012 49.1% 
The Punch 4412 3118 50.9 % 
Total 8944 6130 100% 
Source: Fieldwork survey (2013) 
The Nature of stories on the Crisis 
Table 2 below shows the nature of stories on the crisis under study, ranging from straight news, editorial, opinion, 
pictures, to letters to the editor. Straight news recorded the highest contents of 1,020, while letters to the editor 
had the lowest with 288 items.  
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Table 4:  Showing the nature of stories on the crisis 
Nature of Story Vanguard The Punch Total 
Straight News 1002 (33.3%) 1020 (33%) 2022 (33%) 
Editorial 411 (13.6%) 486 (15.6%) 897 (14.6%) 
Opinions/Columns 314 (10.4%) 323 (10.4%) 637 (10.4%) 
Pictures  922 (30.6%) 1001 (32%) 1923 (31.4%) 
Letters to the Editor 363 (12.1%) 288 (9%) 651 (10.6%) 
Total n= 3012 (100%) n= 3118 (100 %) N= 6130 (100%) 
 Source: Fieldwork survey (2013) 
 
6.2 RQ2: What was the degree of prominence given to the crisis by the press? 
There was a high degree of prominence given the issue. Evidence of this lies in the 705 and 683 editorial items 
that occupied both the front page major and minor of the Punch and Vanguard newspapers respectively. The fact 
that 2,030 and 2,150 news items made the inside pages of the Vanguard and The Punch newspapers further 
justifies the prominence accorded the crisis by the press.  
Table 5:  Showing the prominence given the crisis by the press  
Prominence Vanguard The Punch Total 
Front Page (major & minor) 683 (22.7%) 705 (22.6%) 1388 (22.6%) 
Inside Page (major & minor) 2030 (67.4%) 2150 (69%) 4180 (68.2%) 
Back Page (major & minor) 299 (9.9%) 263 (8.4%) 562 (9.2%) 
Total  n= 3012(100%) n= 3118 (100%) N= 6130 (100%) 
Source: Fieldwork survey (2013) 
6.3 RQ3. What was the direction of the newspapers’ contents on the crisis? 
The direction of the editorial contents of the two newspapers was utterly unfavourable. 1426 editorial items in all 
the 31 editions of the Punch newspapers had negative denotative meanings while a total of 1276 of similar 
unfavourable contents reported by Vanguard newspapers. 
Table 6:  Showing the direction of the papers’ editorial contents 
Direction  Vanguard  The Punch  Total 
Favourable/positive 821 (27.2%) 798 (25.6%) 1619 (26.4%) 
Unfavourable/negative 1276 (42.4%) 1426 (45.7%) 2702 (44.1%) 
Moderate 915 (30.4%) 894 (28.7%) 1809 (29.5%) 
Total  n=3012 (100%) n=3118 (100%) N=6130 (100%) 
Source: Fieldwork survey (2013) 
6.4 RQ4. What was the kind of tone used in the reportage of fuel subsidy removal crisis by the press?  
The tone of reportage of the two newspapers was generally harsh, showing editorial condemnation of the 
government’s policy, as they both recorded a total of 4108 out of 6130 total editorial items. 
Table 7:  Showing the tone of press reportage of the crisis.  
Tone  Vanguard The Punch Total 
Harsh 1991 (66.1%) 2117 (67.9%) 4108 (67%) 
Soft 1021 (33.9%) 1001 (32.1%) 2022 (33%) 
Total  n=3012(100%0 n=3118 (100%) N=6130 (100%) 
Source: Fieldwork survey (2013) 
 
7. Discussion/Inference 
7.1 RQ5. What inference(s) can be drawn on the relationship between press reportage of the issue and 
public perception of it? 
Certain inferences can stem from the intensive reportage of the crisis by the selected newspapers. According to 
Littlejohn and Foss (2008), agenda-setting function is a three-part process. First, the priority of issues to be 
discussed in the media or media agenda must be set. Second, the media agenda in some way affects or interacts 
with what the public thinks, creating the public agenda. Finally, the public agenda affects or interacts in some 
way with what policy-makers consider important, called the policy agenda. Thus by inference, media agenda 
affects public agenda, which in turn affects policy agenda. Clearly, therefore, Littlejohn and Foss’ (2008) three-
part process of agenda-setting function relates to press reportage of the crisis under analysis.  
7.2 Media Agenda 
The President’s January 1, 2012 national broadcast in which he announced the removal of petroleum subsidy 
spurred media agenda. The setting of priority of the issue by the press indicates this, especially with such front-
page headlines as: 
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Fuel subsidy gone, petrol now N141 (The Punch, Monday January 2, 2012) 
Fuel subsidy removal stirs anger, protests (The Punch, Tuesday January 3, 2012) 
Subsidy series: Five Questions President Jonathan Must Answer (Vanguard, January 1, 2012). 
7.3 Public Agenda 
The priority of the crisis discussed by the press, media agenda, interacts with what the Nigerian public thinks, 
and this created public agenda, as Nigerians reacted seriously to the issue. Evidence in this regard lies in the 
casting of front page big headlines as: 
 
Nigerians groan under subsidy chaos (Vanguard, Tuesday January 3, 2012). 
We’ll stand by the people, say Reps; call emergency meeting 
UAD begins protest today 
Subsidy removal ill timed - IBB 
One killed as protests spread (Vanguard, Wednesday January 4, 2012). 
Lagos, Kano, Ilorin affected; Policemen protest in Lagos 
Jonathan summons emergency FEC meeting 
We need a revolution - Okogie 
Subsidy protests rock Lagos, Ibadan, other cities (The Punch, Wednesday January 4, 2012) 
Two killed in Ilorin  
No dialogue with FG – Labour 
Melaye, six others released 
Protests enter Day Four (Punch, Friday January 6, 2012) 
300 protesters wounded, 19 arrested in Kano 
Jonathan to meet govs today over subsidy crisis 
 
7.4 Policy Agenda 
Reaction of Nigerians (public agenda) to what they considered as outrageous increase in the price of petrol as a 
result of the removal of fuel subsidy and outright condemnation of government policy made the policy-maker, 
who had earlier remained adamant and refused to shift ground, as reported by the newspapers, to eventually shift 
ground (policy agenda). This inference is drawn from the two newspapers’ reportage of the reversion of fuel 
price from N141 to N97 by the Federal Government, as shown below. 
Shelve subsidy removal, strike – Reps tell FG, Labour (Vanguard, Monday Jan. 9, 2012) 
Petrol now N97 per litre (Punch, Monday Jan. 16, 2012) 
Petrol price now N97 per litre (Vanguard, Monday Jan. 16, 2012) 
Labour suspends street protests 
 
8. Conclusion 
After a thorough examination of the newspapers’ reports on 2012 fuel subsidy removal crisis, as analysed above, 
it is safe to conclude that there was high editorial focus on the issue by the two newspapers. The editorial items 
of 6130 out of the total 8,944 serve as a premise upon which the conclusion hinges. 
 
The two newspapers also gave considerable prominence to the issue. This conclusion stems from a significant 
number of stories with big headlines that occupied the front and other focal pages of the two newspapers.  
 
The direction of editorial contents of the two newspapers was also not favourable, as the contents highlighted 
denotative meanings. The researchers noticed this through in-depth reading of the manifest contents of the two 
newspapers. The tone of reportage was also harsh. An evidence of this is from the newspapers’ condemnation of 
the government policy by featuring headlines such as:  
 
Protests escalate (Vanguard, Friday, January 6, 2012) 
Oyo, Edo, Kaduna join 
42 injured in Kano, as rally turns violent 
Nigerians groan under subsidy chaos (Vanguard, Tuesday January 3, 2012). 
 
9. Recommendations 
Following the consideration of a range of issues in this study, the following recommendations become relevant:  
First, the government/policy makers must know that the essence of governance is to ensure availability of 
relative welfare packages for the citizenry. Since one of the primary functions of the government is to ensure the 
people‘s welfare, hence, shouldering the responsibility of subsidy should have been one of such ways for the 
government to demonstrate this.  
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Second, government should put in place measures to prioritize the interest of the people.  
Third, since a part of the subsidy has gone, government should make it up to those it presides over by continuing 
to make certain provisions to cushion inflationary effects in the country. 
Fourth, the social welfare measures options such as purchase of government owned buses to reduce the peoples’ 
transportation difficulties, and price fixing instrument/mechanism of the government could be considered to 
checkmate marketers who may tend to capitalize on the policy effect to cause unrealistic inflation within the 
society.  
Finally, government must not appear weak to punish those deserving punishment, and reproach those that merit 
tongue-lashing. Since government has since noted that the subsidy funding enriches few members of a cabal, 
moves aimed at bringing the cabal to justice are necessary. 
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